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Abstract
The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) is the corner-
stone for enabling automated landings without the Instrument Land-
ing System (ILS). Currently GBAS is evolving to GAST-D for CAT
III landings. This extends GBAS via the use of multiple frequencies
(L1/L2 and L5) and the use of multiple global navigation satellite
system constellations. GBAS requires correction data to be broad-
cast to aircraft. This is currently done with the VHF Data Broadcast
(VDB) datalink. However, VDB has several known shortcomings: (1)
low throughput, (2) small area of operation and (3) no cyber-security
measures. In this paper we propose the use of the L-band Digital Aero-
nautical Communications System (LDACS) for broadcasting GBAS
correction data to address these shortcomings. In flight experiments
conducted in 2019, we set up an experimental GBAS installation us-
ing LDACS. Broadcast data was secured using the TESLA broadcast
authentication protocol. Our results indicate that cryptographically
secured GBAS data via LDACS can provide GAST-C and GAST-D
services with high availability if cryptographic parameters are chosen
appropriately.
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1 Introduction
The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) is used to improve the
accuracy of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) to allow GNSS-
based instrument landings of aircraft. It is based on reference stations with
known positions at the airport, which generate correction data and integrity
parameters from GNSS measurements. Correction and integrity data are
transmitted to approaching aircraft. Based on these corrections, aircraft
can calculate their position with precision and confidence in the integrity
of the solution. GBAS enables modern aircraft to perform safe and secure
GNSS-based landings while offering several advantages over the Instrument
Landing System (ILS) commonly used today: Approaches no longer need to
be carried out in a straight line, but can also be curved and with flexible and
higher glide angles; it is cheaper than ILS while, at the same time, being
transparent in use to the aircrew [1].
GBAS requires a datalink to transmit GNSS correction data to the on-
board avionics of the aircraft. As of now, this datalink is specific to GBAS:
The VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) datalink.
With GBAS evolving to GBAS Approach Service Type (GAST)-D, which
shall enable CAT III landings, VDB becomes a limitation: (1) Current ver-
sions of the VDB datalink broadcast only corrections for the L1 frequency
of GPS satellites, which is problematic in terms of availability, especially
in equatorial zones, due to ionospheric disturbances of the GPS reference
measurements required for GBAS [2]. This can be alleviated by extending
GBAS with a multi-frequency and multi-constellation approach, including
also L5 frequencies and the GALILEO, GLONASS, and BeiDou GNSS sys-
tems [3, 4]. However, the VDB datalink is a bottleneck for this extension. It
does not provide sufficient throughput for correction and integrity data for
multiple constellations and frequencies [5, 6]. Large and complex airports
aggravate this issue: In case a single VDB transmitter cannot provide cov-
erage of the complete airport, two transmitters using alternate time slots on
the same VDB channel need to be installed, halving datalink capacity. (2)
The current VDB service range of 42 km has been criticized as being too
small. The criticism is that for pilots to verify that the system is operational
an increased range of GBAS services would reduce the pressure and stress
level during the final approach. (3) Cyber resilience is also problematic with
VDB, since it provides no cyber-security measures comparable to modern
wireless systems [7, 8].
These drawbacks show clearly that GBAS would benefit from a more
capable datalink supporting its unimpeded evolution. A very good candidate
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Figure 1: DLR’s research aircraft Falcon 20-E5 (D-CMET) used in the ex-
periments.
for a capable GBAS broadcast datalink is the L-band Digital Aeronautical
Communications System (LDACS). Currently under ICAO standardization,
LDACS is the future aeronautical datalink for applications related to the
safety and regularity of flight for terrestrial long-range communications [9].
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate an experimental in-flight
implementation of GBAS using L-band Digital Aeronautical Communica-
tion System (LDACS) as datalink (1) to multiply the available bandwidth,
(2) to increase the service range, and (3) to introduce state-of-the-art broad-
cast cyber-security using Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentica-
tion (TESLA) [10]. The flight trials discussed in this paper were co-funded
by the German national research project Migration towards COm/NAV ca-
pabilities of LDACS (MICONAV) and took place in March and April 2019.
MICONAV also performed other experiments not discussed in this paper.
2 Methodology
The main purpose of the experiments was to demonstrate the ability of
LDACS to provide a secure datalink for GBAS. For this purpose we im-
plemented a terrestrial LDACS ground station and GBAS reference station
(Figure 2a and 2b), as well as a software-based GBAS receiver. We mounted
the receiver on a research aircraft (Figure 1 and 2c) and flew the setup in
the vicinity of the ground station.
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Figure 2: Overview of airborne and ground LDACS equipment
2.1 Experimental Setup
The experimental setup consisted of one LDACS aircraft-station and one
LDACS ground-station. The GBAS ground-station was co-located with the
LDACS ground-station. Figure 3 shows the complete experimental setup
in detail: The GBAS ground-station receives GNSS data with a Tallysman
TW 3972 antenna, processes it using a JAVAD Sigma unit and passes it to
the GBAS ground processing software. The processed GBAS data is passed
on to the ground station PC and encrypted with the TESLA protocol before
it is transmitted in a message format specific to the experiment. If desired,
TESLA encryption can be turned off as indicated in the red box at the center
of the diagram. The ground PC is connected to the LDACS ground-station
radio via UDP/IP. In the aircraft-station received messages are processed in
the reverse order to decrypt GBAS correction data. The correction data is
then used by the GBAS software in the aircraft to calculate GBAS Position,
Velocity and Time (PVT) and protection levels.
2.1.1 LDACS Datalink Setup
The LDACS aircraft-station was configured for bidirectional communication
as specified in [11] and [12]. In addition to LDACS radio equipment, the
aircraft-station integrated a Ubuntu 18.04 LTS Linux computer for LDACS
and GBAS airborne data processing, and several measurement and storage
devices, such as a Rubidium clock, a spectrum analyzer and an I/Q data
recorder. Several of these parts are identified in Figure 2c.
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Figure 3: Secure GBAS experimental setup.
antennas were installed on top of an office building at the German Aerospace
Center (DLR) premises near Munich, Germany. The LDACS ground-station
and its parts are shown in Figure 2a and 2b. The location of the ground-
station is indicated in Figure 4.
2.1.2 GBAS Setup
Our experimental setup of the airborne GBAS installation on board the
Falcon 20-E5 research aircraft consisted of a Javad air antenna and a Javad
Delta 3 unit. This setup was used to receive and process GPS, GLONASS,
and Galileo Signals on L1/L2, and L5, and provide data to GBAS airborne
processing where the data was combined with the correction data received
via LDACS to calculate GBAS PVT and protection levels.
The GBAS ground-station used a Tallysman TW3972 antenna. A Javad
Sigma unit was used to process the GPS, GLONASS, and Galileo Signals on
L1/L2, and L5 and send the data to GBAS ground processing. This setup
is based on the setup discussed in [13]. GBAS air and ground processing




GBAS ground processing generates correction and integrity data from the
received GNSS signals. This data is forwarded to the LDACS ground-station
software running on the ground station computer. GBAS data can be trans-
mitted to the aircraft in two ways:
1. GBAS data can be encrypted within the TESLA protocol to secure
GBAS. The secured GBAS message is then transmitted to the aircraft
via LDACS.
2. GBAS data can be left unencrypted. In this case the GBAS message
is immediately transmitted to the aircraft via LDACS.
The (1) TESLA secured or (2) unencrypted GBAS data is transmitted
from the ground station to the airborne station via LDACS radio messages.
The messages received by the LDACS airborne radio are processed and de-
livered via UDP/IP to the processing Ubuntu 18.04 LTS Linux computer
on board the plane. The data is (1) decrypted and authenticated and – if
cryptographic authentication succeeded – delivered to the GBAS airborne
processing framework. If the GBAS data was not encrypted it is (2) just
extracted from the received LDACS messages and immediately forwarded
to GBAS airborne processing. GBAS airborne processing combines the re-
ceived correction and integrity data with the GNSS signals captured by the
Javad Air antenna and the Javad Delta-3 receiver to calculate GBAS PVT
and protection levels.
2.1.4 TESLA Broadcast Authentication
For the experiment, we implemented a version of the TESLA broadcast
authentication protocol to secure GBAS communication over the airgap be-
tween ground-station and aircraft-station. TESLA was first proposed by
Perrig et al. [10], uses symmetric keys, requires time synchonization be-
tween sender and receiver and the ability to buffer messages on the receiver.
Let us assume our communication partners are Alice (the LDACS ground-
station) and Bob (the LDACS aircraft-station). For TESLA, we use three
functions: a hash function F , to generate a self-authenticated key-chain, a
key derivation function F ′ to derive cryptographic keys for Message Authen-
tication Code (MAC) calculations, another hash function F ′′ to calculate
MACs for a message m. First, Alice splits time in equal intervals Tint. Alice
then generates a self-authenticated key-chain (e.g. by choosing a random
start value and then applying a suitable hash function F iteratively) and
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assigns each key ki to its respective interval i of length Tint. Then via a key
derivation function F ′ and with key ki as input, cryptographic keys for MAC
calculations is generated for every interval i (e.g. F ′(ki) = k
′
i). The MACs
are calculated on the messages mi sent out in their respective interval i using
function F ′′ and key k′i and message mi as input (e.g. MACi = F
′′(k′i,mi)).
When Alice sends out messages, Bob can immediately receive them and
buffers them until he can verify the MAC. This is not possible for Bob yet,
as Alice delays the publication of the key Ki, which is required for the cal-
culation of the MAC of message mi in interval i, by a certain time interval
d. With that, Alice ascertains that at time Ti – the time the message was
generated and sent by Alice – only she knew the key for the calculation
of the MAC of that message. Releasing the key Ki d intervals later, Bob
can verify the correctness of the MAC of previously received and buffered
messages. Verification of correctness of MACi proofs to Bob (or any other
party receiving the broadcast message), that the message mi with MACi
was actually sent by Alice, since no one else knew the key ki at time Ti.
For Bob to partake in the TESLA protocol, Alice and Bob need to syn-
chronize their clocks within a margin of acceptable error [10]. Then Alice
sends TESLA parameters such as functions F , F ′ and F ′′, the time interval
schedule consisting of interval duration Tint, start time Ti, index of inter-
val i and the length of the one-way chain, the key disclosure delay d, and
a key commitment to the key chain, allowing Bob to verify that the re-
ceived keys are actually part of the key-chain. These parameters needs to
be distributed in an authenticated manner. In the experiment public keys
and certificates of the ground-station and aircraft-station were bilaterally
exchange via LDACS. In an operational deployment of LDACS the distri-
bution of public keys and certificates will likely be realized via an LDACS
specific public key infrastructure, as described in [14, 15, 16, 17]. Knowing
Alice’s public key, Bob can verify the authenticity of the TESLA parameters
and start buffering messages sent by Alice until he receives the correct key
to verify their authenticity.
Note, that TESLA authentication requires the buffering of received mes-
sages until Alice’s authentication key has been received. This introduces a
key disclosure delay increasing the communication latency between Alice
and Bob.
Time synchronization between aircraft-station and ground-station were
implemented as described in [10]. The exchange of TESLA parameters was
signed via an Ed25519 digital signature of the ground-station. Our imple-
mentation used python3 and the nacl [18] crypto-libary with F being the
SHA-512 hash function for key stream generation and two variations F ′, F ′′
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of the blake2b hash function for MAC key derivation and MAC generation.
2.1.5 Limitations of the Experimental Setup
Our experiments used a single GBAS ground receiver with limited ground
monitoring, thus without ionosphere and ephemeris monitoring or B-value
checks. However this has no influence on the purpose of the experiment,
thus it characterizes GBAS over LDACS similar as proposed in [8].
GBAS corrections and integrity parameters were generated and broad-
cast for GPS, Galileo, and GLONASS for L1 100s and L5 100s processing
modes. As we used the LDACS message format, we did not transmit Final
Approach Segment (FAS) data and did not use the VDB message format.
Transmission of all data was combined in one correction/integrity message
per epoch. Producing corrections for all visible satellites our experimental
setup generated data rates as predicted in [8]: Approximately 3500 Byte/s,
distributed over several communication packets per second. To allow for bet-
ter characterization of LDACS performance each set of corrections (every
0.5 s) was sent twice with the redundant second message 0.2 s delayed.
The position of the antenna on the aircraft was in an unfavorable place
between the wings under the belly of the aircraft. This was due to the
availability of port-holes in the experimental aircraft (c.f. Figure 1).
2.2 Flight Trajectories and Experiments
We performed six experiments in two flights. We chose two different flight
trajectories to demonstrate secure GBAS via LDACS with different pitch
and roll alignments of the aircraft-station and ground-station antennas. Dur-
ing the first flight we transmitted only TESLA secured GBAS via LDACS.
We varied the key verification delay to compare different TESLA parame-
ters for GBAS performance. In the second flight the first two experiments
were conducted with unsecured GBAS via LDACS, while the last exper-
iment used TESLA again. Flight 2 used a more efficient GBAS message
format. The experiments are summarized in Table 1. Both flights included
considerable taxiing times and preparation times on the apron not included
in the table.
The first flight took place on the 26th of March 2019, had takeoff at 08:53
UTC, touch down at 10:50 UTC, and was chosen as dedicated test flight to
demonstrate secure GBAS. Its total airtime was 7000 s with a distance of
1048 km covered. Our goal was to climb, remain at a constant altitude of
6000 m for as long as possible to have different pitch and roll configurations
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Experiment Trajectory Time (s) Security Parameters
01 Flight 1 762.160 TESLA Tint = 1s d = 1
02 Flight 1 3,755.519 TESLA Tint = 1s d = 2
03 Flight 1 1,459.296 TESLA Tint = 1s d = 2
04 Flight 2 1,213.501 unsecured improved msg. format
05 Flight 2 2,765.582 unsecured improved msg. format
06 Flight 2 3,028.761 TESLA Tint = 1s d = 2
improved msg. format
Table 1: Flight trajectories and experiments.
towards the ground-station antenna at constant altitude, and then descend
and land, which we achieved as plotted in figure 4a.
The second flight trajectory was used to directly compare TESLA se-
cured GBAS via LDACS and unsecured GBAS via LDACS in several ex-
periments during the same flight. We chose a greater distance to our
ground-station, two different flight altitudes, steeper and longer curves and
missed approaches provoking and resulting in more antenna shadowing. We
achieved all of these prerequisites as shown in figure 4b. Takeoff was on the
2nd of April 2019 at 14:03 UTC, touch down at 16:06 UTC with a total
flight time of 7424 s and 1291 km covered with the trajectory depicted in
Figure 4b.
3 Results
The quality of GBAS is determined by its availability. We use “GAST-
C” and “GAST-D” availability according to RTCA DO-253D [19], sections
2.3.8.1.3.1 and 2.3.11.5.2.1.1/2.
We start with a detailed view around the airport, measuring the GBAS
correction age in Fig. 5a. As GBAS is designed as a landing system, but also
for ground guidance, taxiing and guided departures are of great interest in
the future. Figure 5a shows GBAS correction age during arrival, departure
(flight 1), 3 go-arounds (flight 2), and taxiing. Throughout the taxiing and
in the air close to the airport we experienced stable performance with cor-
rection ages well below the requirements with a single short (10 s) LDACS
outage during one of the go-arounds. Note that taxiways and runways are
covered although the ground-station antenna is shadowed by a hangar build-
ing. Figure 5b shows the availability of the GBAS solutions over the entire
course of flight 2. We see that in most situations during flight 2 we had
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(a) Flight 1. (b) Flight 2.
Figure 4: Trajectory, speed and altitude of secure GBAS via LDACS exper-
imental flights. The location of the ground station is marked “GS-OP” for
Ground-Station Oberpfaffenhofen near Munich, Germany.
GAST-D coverage implying a GBAS correction age of less than two sec-
onds. Analyzing the median and 95% percentile (P95%) of the correction
age in Table 2 these observations are confirmed.
Note, that in experiments 01 - 03 one GBAS message was fragmented
into five LDACS packets. In experiments 04 - 06 a more efficient message
format was used. No fragmentation was needed in these experiments. This
resulted in lower correction ages for flight 2.
3.1 Increased Datalink Throughput
Our experiments generated and transmitted GBAS correction and integrity
data for GPS, GLONASS, and Galileo on L1/L2, and L5. The measured
offered load and throughput on the LDACS data link is presented in Ta-
ble 3. Our results indicate that depending on the GBAS update rate 31-50
kbps were required for GBAS GAST-D services in dual-frequency and multi-
constellation mode. The difference in data load between flight 1 and 2 is a
result of a change of the experimental GBAS message format. Note that the
generated GBAS data also depends on the number of visible satellites. Tak-
ing into account that the minimum data rate offered by LDACS is 300 kbps
in the ground-to-air direction, LDACS offers more than enough capacity
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Exp. Security Median P95% GAST-C GAST-D
Cor. Cor. Availa- Availa-
Age Age bility bility
Flight 1 (GBAS message fragmented in 5 LDACS packets)
01 after TESLA (d = 1) 1.8s 2.2s 88.17% 87.40%
before authentication 0.9s 1.3s 99.92% 99.84%
02 after TESLA (d = 2) 2.8s 3.3s 97.91% 97.90%
before authentication 0.9s 1.3s 99.40% 99.40%
03 after TESLA (d = 2) 2.8s 3.2s 99.30% 99.30%
before authentication 0.9s 1.3s 99.84% 99.84%
Flight 2 (GBAS message not fragmented)
04 unsecured 0.4s 0.6s 99.98% 99.98%
05 unsecured 0.4s 0.6s 99.66% 99.61%
06 after TESLA (d = 2) 2s 2.6s 97.61% 97.61%
before authentication 0.4s 0.6s 99.97% 99.97%
Table 2: GBAS via LDACS correction age and availability. Note that ex-
periment 04 and 05 did not employ TESLA. In all other experiments GBAS











(a) GBAS correction age at EDMO Air-
port.
(b) GBAS availability in flight 2.
Figure 5: Age of GBAS correction data in the experiments.
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Exp. Duration Avg. Offered Avg. Through- Loss
in (s) Load in (kbps) put in (kbps) in %
Flight 1
01 762.160 49.80 49.31 0.99
02 3,755.519 45.56 44.94 1.37
03 1,459.296 48.10 47.93 0.36
Flight 2
04 1,213.501 34.58 34.43 0.43
05 2,765.582 34.19 33.86 0.94
06 3,028.761 31.69 31.37 1.01
Table 3: GBAS over LDACS datalink throughput.
to support GBAS, Air Traffic Services (ATS) or Aeronautical Operational
Control (AOC) on the same channel.
3.2 Increased Service Range
The LDACS specification [20] stipulates at a maximum averaged EIRP of
52 dBm resulting in maximum designed communication range of 200 NM.
However, local regulations allowed us to transmit only an EIRP of 40 dBm
in our experiments. This reduction of 12 dBm – assuming free-space path
loss – should result in a reduced communication range of at least 50 NM
(92.6 km).
During the testing of GBAS in flights 1 and 2 we reached a maximum
distance of 61 km and 94 km respectively. On both occasions we could
send and receive GBAS packets, making the maximum demonstrated GBAS
via LDACS service range in in our experiment 94 km. As the service vol-
ume of GBAS contains 42 km around the local ground facility with the
VDB datalink, we demonstrated the possibility to double that distance with
12 dBm EIRP less than foreseen for an operational LDACS deployment.
3.3 Cyber-Security
TESLA security adds a configurable key disclosure delay to the authentica-
tion latency. We chose conservative key disclosure delays for our experiments
and set the interval length to one second (Tint = 1s) and the key delay to
one time interval (d = 1) for experiment 01 and two intervals (d = 2) for all
other experiments.
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Figure 6: Latencies of secured GBAS messages. Note that the GBAS mes-
sages in experiment 01 and 02 have been fragmented into five LDACS pack-
ets. Latency can be improved with the more efficient message format used
in flight 2.
Changing the key delay resulted in different authentication latency mea-
surements. Secure GBAS messages sent in experiment 01 experienced ap-
proximately one second less latency. This verifies the correctness of the
implementation of the TESLA protocol, as in experiment 01 all messages
can already be verified when they have received the key in the next mes-
sage (d = 1), whereas in all other experiments, the right key is contained in
the message after the next message (d = 2). The one second difference in
authentication latency is clearly visible in Figure 6a and 6b. Note that the
latency values of these figures are not directly comparable to the correction
ages presented in Table 2. The GBAS correction age is measured relative
to the start of the GBAS epoch, the communication latency is not.
TESLA cyber-security adds additional load to the datalink. TESLA
added on average 104 B per secured GBAS message. Time synchroniza-
tion and parameter exchange during the set up of TESLA added additional
2145 B to each experiment. This resulted in an average security data over-
head of 7.43% per message.
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4 Discussion
Safety and security are strongly interrelated in aviation which makes strong
cyber-security a key enabler for digitalization in aviation [21]. Unfortunately
cyber-security for aeronautical communication is still not realized in most
deployed systems [22, 23]. Terrestrial datalinks such as VDB have a low
data rate of 28.416 kbps and no state-of-the-art cyber-security features [24,
21, 23].
In our experiments we demonstrated a viable alternative to VDB offering
at least 10 times the net capacity in data rate and profound cyber-security
measures. With TESLA on top of LDACS, we have shown that additional
dedicated broadcast message authentication is realistic and feasible. An
important result is that all TESLA authenticated messages, that reached
the aircraft, could be verified. This showed the good choice of TESLA
as broadcast authentication protocol, as all GBAS messages secured via
TESLA could be verified to have been sent by an authentic ground station.
This, and our analysis of throughput and latency show that TESLA provides
good security for GBAS via LDACS with reasonable security overhead and
acceptable latency.
The latency of LDACS is sufficient to enable time shifted broadcast
authentication protocol such as TESLA. However, we have seen that the
parameter choice of TESLA is important here. Up to a delay of one second,
the latency for TESLA secured GBAS messages via LDACS remains low
enough to stay within the requirements for GAST-C and GAST-D services.
Tweaking the time interval and key delay times might lead to even shorter
latencies than demonstrated in our experiments.
LDACS offers at least a range of 94 km for GBAS service. With higher
LDACS transmission power this range could be drastically increased to
200 NM. However, depending on the region and the local properties of the
ionosphere, GBAS correction data may not necessarily be useful more than
100 NM away from the reference station [25, 26]. However, the current
GBAS service volume of 42 km was criticized as too small in the past. The
argument is that the corrections are not used beyond the service volume
point for landing service but from the intercept point to the final approach,
but for the pilot to verify that the system is already operational. An in-
creased range of GBAS services would reduce the pressure and stress level
of the pilots during the final approach, as they can check availability and
operational correctness of the GBAS service significantly earlier than today.
GBAS has only a minor siting problem concerning VDB, however, LDACS
may offer improvements here, too. Siting problems are often related to the
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reference antennas, VDB is not so critical and often simply co-located with
the VHF communication antennas. There are, however, large complex air-
ports like Frankfurt where a VDB transmitter cannot ensure coverage on
all runways. Today those airports work with two VDB transmitters on the
same channel which halves the capacity due to alternating slots. A different
technical solution not halving the capacity of the data link is very much
desirable. This solution must ensure coverage on all runways for the rollout
guidance up to 12 ft above the ground. With our demonstration of GBAS via
LDACS on the apron, taxiway, and runway, we demonstrated that LDACS
can provide such a solution.
5 Conclusion
Our experiments demonstrated, that multi-constellation, multi-frequency
GBAS can be realized using LDACS efficiently and securely.
Also, LDACS may provide additional benefits to GBAS: It offers enough
data-rate to broadcast cryptographically secured GBAS data, while offering
spare capacity for other Air Traffic Services (ATS) or Aeronautical Opera-
tional Control (AOC) services on the same channel. We have shown that
LDACS can extend the GBAS service range into the order of 100 km. And
we have seen, that GBAS via LDACS works in non-line-of-sight situations
with approximately the same GBAS availability as measured during flight.
We demonstrated the possibility to protect broadcast data with the broad-
cast authentication protocol TESLA. Our results show, that TESLA is well
suited for securing GBAS data via LDACS, however TESLA parameters
have to be chosen carefully.
The advantages of GBAS over LDACS – (1) increased data rate, (2)
increased range, and (3) cyber-security – indicate clearly that further devel-
opment of secure GBAS over LDACS may be a key enabler for the future
evolution of GBAS.
6 Acronyms
DLR German Aerospace Center
FAS Final Approach Segment
GAST GBAS Approach Service Type
GBAS Ground Based Augmentation System
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
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ILS Instrument Landing System
LDACS L-band Digital Aeronautical Communication System
MAC Message Authentication Code
MICONAV Migration towards COm/NAV capabilities of LDACS
PVT Position, Velocity and Time
TESLA Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication
VDB VHF Data Broadcast
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